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When a Person Wants to Die:
Legal Considerations
With the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide in Oregon, individuals
in other states have begun to closely
examine their own legislative restric-
tions and their personal options to
determine end-of-life decisions.
Examined below are the medical rea-
sons why people may want to die, the
legal background and current status of
existing laws, the various options open
to the terminally ill person (voluntary
dehydration, suicide, assisted dying,
euthanasia, and the double effect), and
the role of the legal counselor.
By Charles F. McKhann, M.D.
Charles F. McKhann, M.D., is a professor in the
Department of Surgery at Yale University School of
Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut.
he thought that a person who is seri-
"W ously ill may need to turn to an attor-
ney for advice on how to end his or her
life is hard to imagine. However, that
day may be approaching as the com-
plexities associated with illness and death implicate
legal issues. The legalization of physician-assisted
suicide in Oregon has encouraged individuals in
many other states to closely examine their own leg-
islative restrictions and their personal options, both
legal and otherwise. This article will discuss the
medical reasons why people may want to die, the
legal background and the current status of existing
laws, the various options open to the person who is
terminally ill, and the role of the attorney in coun-
seling such a person.' While information about
mechanics and methodology for ending life would
probably come from a physician, an attorney is a
reasonable source for information about minimiz-
ing the legal risk for family, friends, physicians, and
other caregivers.
Why Would a Person Want to Die?
Someone who is seriously ill and has a short life
expectancy may wish to terminate his or her life for
a variety of reasons. Foremost among them is to
avoid unnecessary pain and other forms of suffer-
ing, including common events such as nausea, vom-
iting, inability to swallow or talk, incontinence,
extreme fatigue, and a sense of suffocation. Closely
associated with these actual symptoms is the fear of
such symptoms. Cancer patients usually experience
severe pain before adequate pain control can be
instituted. Because more medication may be need-
ed later, large doses of morphine are not used to
control low levels of pain. Instead, medication is
increased as needed and not usually before the
patient experiences the more severe pain. Hence,
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the fear is founded on experience and reality.
Another reason a person may wish to die is to
maintain desired levels of dignity and quality of
existence, preferring to end life before these two
goals are obliterated by disease. Finally, and per-
haps most important, is the desire of many to exer-
cise their autonomy and to be in control of the cir-
cumstances of their dying. This desire often comes
to the fore in response to the significant loss of con-
trol imposed by the disease and its treatment.
In an era of managed care, which is all too
often mismanaged, with many millions of people
uninsured, it is uncomfortable to think that severe-
ly ill people would wish to shorten their lives for
financial or altruistic reasons. However, the com-
plexities of our health care system are such that
this is indeed a fact and likely to remain so for
years to come. The burden of prolonged terminal
illness can wipe out the savings of a family. For
some families, the financial burdens may extend
one or two generations beyond the person who is
dying, taking with them college educations and
financial security.
History of Suicide
In ancient Greece and Rome, suicide was an hon-
orable and accepted way to end life in the face of
significant suffering. Physicians were expected to
provide hemlock and other drugs to make this pos-
sible. Although suicide was always against the
teachings of Judaism, early Christianity tolerated it
because the promise of eternal life in heaven was
made so attractive that many sought martyrdom to
obtain this goal. This attitude was finally brought
to an end in the fifth century A.D. by St. Augustine,
who taught that suicide was the deliberate killing
of oneself and therefore prohibited under the com-
mandment "Thou shall not kill." This prohibition
was absolute and remains so today in the teaching
of the modern Catholic Church. The church, how-
ever, was joined by the state in the late middle ages.
Kings could see no reason why the church should
confiscate property following a suicide while they,
the rulers, needed the money just as badly. By mak-
ing suicide against the law, the crown could acquire
the property, and did so until modern times.
The twentieth century saw the medicalization of
suicide. Suicidal thoughts or attempts were consid-
ered signs of mental illness and to be treated if at
all possible. In the 1960s, various states abolished
their laws against suicide, not because they thought
that suicide was truly justifiable, but because mak-
ing the suicide attempt a criminal act gave the
wrong message to patients who needed treatment if
they survived. In full bloom, the medicalization of
suicide presumes that people who wish to end their
lives prematurely are by definition mentally dis-
turbed, irrational, and not responsible for their
actions.
Bad Deaths
While it seems irreverent to think of any deaths as
being good deaths, there are some illnesses that are
often associated with prolonged and severe termi-
nal suffering. These include cancer, AIDS, two neu-
rological diseases associated with severe muscular
weakness (multiple sclerosis and amyotrophic lat-
eral sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig's disease), and pul-
monary failure. Added to this list must be the most
common and in many respects the most feared of
all afflictions of the aged, Alzheimer's disease.
Years ago, we feared being snuffed out by dis-
ease too early in life. Now, in far greater numbers,
we fear prolonged dying with extreme suffering or
even lingering deaths that may include years of
being incapacitated and in nursing homes. Public
interest in assisted dying is centered on our fears of
these two possibilities, fears that are reinforced by
the experience of family and friends and by visits to
hospitals, hospices, and nursing homes. Today, we
are beginning to realize that it is possible to have
longer and more fruitful lives and still be spared the
needless distress of a bad death.
Rational Suicide
We are gradually recognizing that people who want
to die are not all necessarily depressed and irra-
tional; rather, some have valid reasons that are eas-
ily understood by objective and rational people.
People wishing to terminate their lives understand
their diseases and where they are in the course of
their illnesses; the alternatives to an earlier death
such as further treatment, comfort care, and/or
hospice; the impact that an earlier death will have
on their family and friends; and the compatibility
of the decision with their other personal values and
beliefs. They may have considered their decision
over a significant period of time and discussed it
with objective listeners such as physicians, attor-
neys, and family members.
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Although an individual may not be competent
in all spheres, he or she may be perfectly competent
to make medical decisions. For example, a sane
person may not be able to balance his or her check-
book or even know today's date. In the medical
sense, competence is a decision-specific process.
Absolute orientation to time and place is not
required to understand the risks and consequences
of dangerous but potentially life-saving surgery. It
should be understood and accepted that the desire
of seriously ill patients to shorten the duration of
their suffering is by itself no reason to consider
them incompetent to make a medical decision.
Closely associated with competence is the ques-
tion of depression in people who wish to end their
lives and suffering early. Clinical depression, which
often leads people to suicide, is usually quite dis-
tinct from the sadness and "reactive" depression
that is experienced and expressed by people with
fatal illnesses. Superficially, the two emotional
states are similar in that insomnia, fatigue, loss of
energy, poor appetite, weight loss, and feelings of
hopelessness are common to both. The distinction
between clinical and reactive depression is that the
person who has clinical depression usually has a
history of previous depressive episodes, even
attempts at suicide, and often has required treat-
ment. Such people are usually withdrawn and have
poor relationships with others. They express feel-
ings of worthlessness, guilt, shame, and low self-
esteem. Their depression is often complete, extend-
ing to every aspect of life, so that there is no plea-
sure or enjoyment to be experienced or anticipated.
The death wishes may be truly self-destructive and
even violent, motivated by anger and the desire for
revenge against other people or the world at large.
When clinical depression comes on for the first
time after a major loss, such as a death, loss of a
job, or loss of a partner, it is usually self-limited,
with complete and permanent recovery. Bipolar
depression is episodic, and therefore self-limited;
but the patient knows that it will recur.
In contrast, reactive depression to a terminal ill-
ness is built around the illness itself. Blame is cen-
tered on the disease, not on self, family, or the out-
side world. The grim, long-term outlook augments
the stress of the illness and the treatment. Rapport
with the family is usually good and continuous,
and the patients are often very concerned about the
effect that their deaths will have on loved ones.
They may even see death as a form of altruism to
avoid being a burden on their families or commu-
nities. Instead of having guilt or regrets about their
past life, people with reactive depression are more
apt to express pride in their accomplishments and
see themselves as good people beset by a bad dis-
ease. They usually continue to enjoy what they can
in life, looking forward to significant holidays and
enjoying the company of family and special friends.
They may even have some limited goals such as
arranging their affairs properly. A sense of humor
is often retained and even used to raise the spirits
of others. Dying patients usually consider their dis-
eases to be a violation of what was previously a
normal life. They would prefer to live if they could
do so in comfort but would prefer death to their
current condition. Most physicians and psychia-
trists do not have any trouble distinguishing
between these two forms of depression.
Legal Background and Court Decisions
The advancing tide of autonomy and personal
rights has brought us to the point where our courts
and public opinion are ambivalent about legaliza-
tion of assisted dying. Public polls for many years
have indicated that 65 percent of our population
believe that more permissive laws should be passed.
However, most attempts to pass such laws have
failed. Because the issue is emotionally and politi-
cally hot, legislatures avoid it whenever possible.
Furthermore, appellate courts in our federal system
are split on the constitutionality of the right to
assisted dying. Individuals, legislators, and courts
consider assisted dying a private and personal issue
between the patient and physician that should not
be under legal control at all. To better understand
the current issue it is important to review the legal
steps that have taken place over the last 50 years
that have brought us to our present position and
will almost certainly carry us into the future.
Background Cases: Autonomy and Personal
Rights
The modern era of legal recognition of autonomy
and personal rights with respect to health matters
began in 1965 with the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Griswold v. State of Connecticut.' The
Supreme Court concluded that states could not
prohibit the use of contraceptives by married
adults.' Prior to this decision, many states had laws
against the sale of contraceptive devices under any
circumstances. Shortly after this case was decided,
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the right to purchase and use contraceptives was
extended to unmarried people.
In Roe v. Wade,' the U.S. Supreme Court signif-
icantly extended privacy rights, concluding that
women's right to privacy and autonomy included
the right to have an abortion under almost any cir-
cumstances. The Court's decision has been under
unrelenting attack over the years, even within the
Supreme Court itself. Several states have succeeded
in limiting women's rights to abortion, but at the
present time it seems unlikely that the original deci-
sion will be completely reversed.
Background Cases: Refusing and Withdrawing
Treatment
Although the issue of abortion near the beginning
of life continues in the public eye, the extension of
personal rights and autonomy to the end of life is
on its own legal journey. In 1975, Karen Ann
Quinlan collapsed with respiratory failure at a
party following an unfortunate combination of
alcohol and drugs.' Her condition developed into a
persistent vegetative state requiring a respirator
and nourishment through a tube in her stomach.
Her parents requested that the respirator be
removed to allow her to die but the physician, hos-
pital, and trial judge refused. However, the New
Jersey Supreme Court cited the right to privacy and
stated that "the State's interest contra weakens and
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree
of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis
dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the State's interest."7
Quinlan was taken off of the respirator but sur-
prisingly resumed spontaneous respiration and sur-
vived until 1985. The principle of privacy, howev-
er, was established, as was the right of the family to
speak for the patient.
In Cruzan v. Harmon,' the Missouri Supreme
Court was confronted with the family's right to dis-
continue treatment. Following a car accident in
1983, Nancy Cruzan remained in a persistent veg-
etative state, dependent on tube feedings, although
not dependent on mechanical respiration. The pri-
mary issue before the court included whether the
individual has the personal right to refuse treat-
ment. The second issue was whether the family's
decision-making rights were as influential as the
individual's rights. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that the state's interest outweighed that of the
parents who would not be allowed to decide for an
incompetent child without clear evidence of what
the child herself would have preferred.'
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Missouri
court's decision and in addition asserted that the
competent conscious individual has an absolute
right to refuse treatment.o Cruzan was allowed to
die when friends testified that she had talked to
them about not wanting to live with artificial sup-
port. Although two states, Missouri and New
York, require strong evidence of the individual's
personal feelings on the subject, following the
Cruzan decision, major steps were taken in every
state to encourage people to examine their own
wishes and prepare advance directives.
In addition to the Supreme Court's decision in
Cruzan, several state supreme courts advanced the
rights of patients or their surrogates to refuse med-
ical treatment and life support. In In re Conroy,"
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a family
could request termination of artificial feeding
through a nasal gastric tube when the patient was
incompetent. Additionally, in Bouvia,12 the
California Supreme Court held that a competent
patient had a right to refuse tube feedings, regard-
less of her motives. In Bouvia, although the plain-
tiff knew that she would die, the court felt that the
decision was neither medical nor legal but person-
al. Although Bouvia was granted the right to dis-
continue treatment, she elected to continue treat-
ment and remain alive.
It is interesting to note that many of these and
other formative cases involved patients who were
incompetent or unconscious, thus leaving the
responsibility to decide with the families. The
courts seemed reluctant to deal with the wishes of
the fully competent patient who, with appropriate
reason, wished to die. This situation still pertains
today with respect to physician-assisted dying.
Federal Courts and the Supreme Court
In the previously discussed cases, the primary issue
was whether the right to discontinue medical treat-
ment was a constitutionally protected right. In con-
trast, in Compassion in Dying" the issue before the
court was whether a person who is terminally ill
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
hastening his or her death. The plaintiffs included
four physicians, three patients, and an organization
called Compassion in Dying. The three patients
were terminally ill, competent adult patients who
wished to hasten their deaths with the aid of their
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physicians. However, the physicians were deterred
from providing assistance because a Washington
statute made it a felony to knowingly aid another
person in committing suicide. On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals held that the statute prohibiting
"physicians from prescribing life ending medica-
tions for use by terminally ill, competent adults
who wished to hasten their own deaths, violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."14 Furthermore, the court stated that "not
only is that state's interest in preventing such indi-
viduals from hastening their deaths of compara-
tively little weight, but its insistence on frustrating
their wishes seems cruel indeed.""
Similarly, in Quill v. Koppell,'6 two New York
statutes penalizing physician-assisted suicide were
challenged for violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plain-
tiffs were physicians who asserted that the penalties
within the statute prohibited them from complying
with the requests of their terminally ill, mentally
competent patients for help in hastening their
deaths. On appeal, the court of appeals held that
"physicians who are willing to do so may prescribe
drugs to be self-administered by mentally compe-
tent patients who seek to end their lives during the
final stages of a terminal illness.""
The U.S. Supreme Court heard Quill and
Compassion in Dying on appeal in Washington v.
Glucksberg." The Court overturned the appellate
court decisions, voting unanimously that the
statutes in New York and Washington did not vio-
late the Constitution." Several statements softened
the Court's seemingly total rejection of assisted
dying. Justice Rehnquist noted that "throughout
the nation, Americans are engaged in ernest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician assisted suicide. Our hold-
ing permits this debate to continue, as it should in
a Democratic society."20 Justice Souter stated that
the court should "stay its hand to allow reasonable
legislative consideration," acknowledging that
"legislative institutional competence is the better
one to deal with that claim at this time."2" Justice
O'Connor emphasized the use of the double effect,
that no restriction should be placed on the medica-
tions that patients receive from qualified physicians
to alleviate their suffering, even if it causes uncon-
sciousness and hastens death. "The challenging
task of crafting appropriate procedures for safe-
guarding . . . liberty interest is entrusted to the
'laboratory' of the States."22 Justice Breyer would
substitute "the right to die with dignity" for "the
right to commit suicide with another's assis-
tance."" At the core of new laws "would lay per-
sonal control over the manner of death, profes-
sional medical assistance, and the avoidance of
unnecessary and severe physical suffering com-
bined." 24 Justice Stevens noted that there is "signif-
icant tension between the traditional view of the
physician's role and the actual practice in a grow-
ing number of cases. . . . I would not foreclose the
possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to
hasten her death or a doctor whose assistance was
sought, could prevail in a more particularized chal-
lenge." Future cases will determine whether such a
challenge may succeed.""
The somewhat hedged opinions of the Supreme
Court, reversing very strong opinions of two lower
courts, reflect the ambivalence of the public and
our court system concerning assisted dying and the
obviously conservative outlook of our current
Supreme Court. Many see these decisions as leav-
ing the door ajar for the states and for individuals
and their physicians to consider and act on their
own attitudes toward assisted dying.
The Laboratory of the States
There have been many instances where state legis-
latures have delayed or avoided addressing contro-
versial issues. Abortion and assisted dying are
clearly such issues. A few states have the option of
addressing issues through public initiatives or ref-
erendums to bypass their legislatures through a
more representative approach to lawmaking when
needed. Three states, California, Washington, and
Oregon, attempted to pass laws permitting physi-
cian-assisted dying. These initiatives were defeated
in California and Washington by narrow margins
of 52 to 48, but passed in Oregon with 60 percent
of the population voting in favor of assisted dying.
Oregon is the only state to carry such a law in
its books at the present time, but several others are
examining the issue closely, with Maine planning
for a public initiative in November of 2000. The
Oregon law requires that the patient have a termi-
nal illness, with a life expectancy of less than six
months. In addition, the statute requires that the
patient must be suffering and must understand the
nature of the decision, the prognosis, and the avail-
able alternatives, including comfort care and hos-
pice. The patient must make the request on at least
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two occasions, two weeks apart. One request must
be in writing and witnessed. The patient must be
competent and informed. Two physicians must talk
with the patient and examine him or her, affirming
that the request is autonomous and that the patient
is competent and appropriately informed. Either
physician may request psychiatric review.
In 1998, 23 people in Oregon were given pre-
scriptions for lethal drugs.2 ' Fifteen used the drug
to end their lives, six died without taking any
drugs, and two were still alive at the end of the
year. There was no record that any of these indi-
viduals suffered from major depression or was in
any way pushed or abused by others.
The Patient's Options
With this medical and legal background, we can
now look at what are today's options for the com-
petent, conscious patient who is suffering signifi-
cantly and wants to die sooner rather than later. We
have already seen that the right to refuse or dis-
continue treatment extends to all forms of artificial
support systems, including artificial feeding. The
natural extension of this is to refuse normal, oral
ingestion of food and drink.
Voluntary Dehydration
Although dehydration and starvation contribute to
the deaths of many terminal patients, including
those in hospice, the possibility of using dehydra-
tion to deliberately shorten life is rarely considered.
This may be because the image of adding thirst to
other end-of-life problems is not acceptable. It is
well recognized, however, that the terminal patient
does not appreciate thirst in the same way as does
a healthy person and the symptoms are quite easily
controlled. Death from dehydration, in which no
fluids are ingested, is associated with a form of
autosedation and somnolence and usually takes
seven to 10 days. This situation is not the same as
starvation, where fluids are provided and the dying
process can require many weeks.
The combination of voluntary dehydration and
sedation provides a route to ending life early that is
legally and morally acceptable. The patient has a
right to refuse to take food or fluids and the physi-
cian can provide appropriate analgesia and seda-
tion to control the symptoms of the underlying dis-
ease as well as the thirst. Controversy exists around
the difference between terminal dehydration,
which is initiated by the patient and supported by
the physician, and terminal sedation, in which the
physician first provides heavy sedation so the
patient cannot eat or drink. The interface between
these two allows the physician and patient some
latitude to negotiate how much sedation to provide
and when. Legally, it is preferable if the patient ini-
tiates the process by refusing food and drink a few
hours before any sedation is instituted. From then
on the physician is treating the patient's symptoms,
ensuring that death is free of suffering, which he or
she is justified to do. The law does not look upon
the refusal of fluids by a dying patient as suicide,
and therefore providing relief of symptoms is not
assisting suicide.
Suicide v. Assisted Dying
Suicide through the use of firearms or other violent
methods is entirely too common today, particular-
ly among elderly men. It does represent a potential
method for the terminally ill person who has the
strength and the equipment to carry out the act. On
the other hand, it imposes violence on the person
who is really seeking peace. It is a lonely act that
cannot be discussed with anyone else. It is also an
antisocial act that still carries a heavy stigma in our
society. Finally, suicide is intensely painful for the
family who retains a horrible image of personal
violence and tremendous guilt over not recognizing
the problem or attempting to solve it. It is fre-
quently seen as an ultimate act of rejection. Suicide
with drugs has the advantage of being painless and
nonviolent. Appropriate drugs can be difficult for
most people to obtain, although they are readily
accessible on many urban street corners. Once on
hand, the drugs must be successfully hidden lest
some family member find them and thwart the
plan. Secrecy and exclusion are necessary elements
in most suicides.
The patient with a terminal disease who wishes
to end his or her suffering has little in common
with a young person who is distressed over a ter-
minated love affair. In contrast to the term "sui-
cide," assisted dying is a more appropriate term for
the terminally ill person. Here a physician, prefer-
ably one who knows the patient and his or her dis-
ease, provides a prescription for a lethal drug that
the patient can take if and when he or she so
desires. Many patients take solace in having on
hand the means to end their own lives, although
they never actually do so. The physician is in a
position to evaluate the patient's disease and his or
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her understanding of the prognosis and to encour-
age the patient to discuss his or her plans with
appropriate members of the family. The physician
should not have to insist that the family be
involved, but in states where assisted dying is
against the law this involvement may be essential to
protect the physician from subsequent legal action
brought on by some member of the family.
Assisted dying has been legalized in Oregon, but
in all other states it is still against the law. However,
there are many physicians who are known to help
appropriate patients die, and many more say that
they would do so if it were legal. Patients can con-
front their physicians directly with their problems
and their needs. The physician in turn may or may
not agree to help. A patient who is insistent on
dying may avoid such direct confrontation by ask-
ing for sleeping pills, usually of the barbiturate
family, to ensure proper sleep. By requesting drugs
that suppress respirations, patients would be
allowed to end their own lives when and if they
chose to. The physician may recognize this
approach but comply with the request regardless of
the patient's intent. Some physicians have been
known to suggest such an approach when they
themselves are uncomfortable with the more direct
request. The final act is an autonomous one, clear-
ly in the hands of the patient, with the physician
being removed from the event once he or she has
provided the prescription.
Euthanasia
In voluntary active euthanasia, the physician
directly administers a lethal drug to the patient,
usually intravenously. Although this method is
legal and is the favored method of assisted dying in
Holland, it is neither legal nor being seriously con-
templated in the United States at the present time.
An advantage of this method includes the certainty
that the intervention will not fail. Unlike prescrib-
ing medication, this method transfers the responsi-
bility for ending a patient's life to the physician
rather than requiring that the patient take the final
step. From the physician's point of view, euthana-
sia is a far more active step than writing a pre-
scription that may or may not be used. The drugs
used to end life through euthanasia usually include
a barbiturate to produce a deep sleep followed by a
muscle relaxant to stop respiration. The immediate
effect and responsibility for the act makes most
physicians reject this approach. Physicians opposed
to this approach have at their disposal a backdoor
to euthanasia that is open and frequently used.
The Double Effect
Many drugs have side effects that must be accepted
if one wishes to obtain the primary effect. Chief
among these is morphine, the drug most common-
ly used to control severe pain. Morphine's major
side effect is suppression of respiration. Although
the concept of the double effect had its origins in
the Catholic Church to rationalize killing in self-
defense and in war, it is commonly applied to med-
ical situations and is the morally and medically
acceptable umbrella under which physicians often
help people to die. The requirements are that the
drug must be given primarily for its good effect,
namely to relieve pain. Death should not be the
intended result of giving the drug but may be fore-
seen and accepted as a possible consequence. The
benefit of pain relief should outweigh the risks of
earlier death. However, the intent can be nebulous
and subjective and even adjusted to meet circum-
stances. The patient may see death as preferable to
continued suffering, and death may be his or her
primary, not secondary, goal. From the physician's
point of view, large doses of narcotics are often
needed and the question is how far can the physi-
cian go in providing such relief before his or her
intent is questioned and the bounds of the double
effect exceeded. In reality, many patients are
allowed to die through the double effect of narcot-
ic drugs such as morphine. The double effect is usu-
ally exercised in the hospital or hospice where
appropriate drugs can be given continuously. The
doses may be increased independently by the physi-
cian or may be requested by the patient or family:
"I don't want to suffer (we do not want to see him
suffer) at all, no matter what."
Attorney's Role"
The attorney's responsibility to dying patients is to
understand exactly what patients want and why
and to advise them accordingly. The attorney must
know what the patient's options are, recognizing
that the options may be governed and even limited
by where the patient is domiciled at the time. The
three usual places are in a nursing home or hospi-
tal or at home. We will look at the most common
issues and options in each of these locations.
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In the Nursing Home
The competent patient who is in a nursing home
may wish to write an advance directive or to ensure
the acceptance of one that was written in the past.
Such instruction usually involves withholding
treatment in terminal disease when the patient may
no longer be competent. Some nursing homes
accept "Do Not Resuscitate" orders written in the
hospital while others require new orders.
For the patient who is already incompetent, the
family or a surrogate may request legal help to
force the nursing home to obey an existing advance
directive. The most common issue is the treatment
of a demented patient (usually with Alzheimer's
disease) for an acute infection. Pneumonia, charac-
terized as the "old man's friend," was the usual
cause of death of many elderly nursing home resi-
dents. However, nursing homes are now quick to
transfer patients who have acute infections to the
emergency room of a nearby hospital where antibi-
otic treatment is almost always instituted. The
patient may return to the nursing home in a few
days, weakened but alive, to face gradual decline
until another infection comes along months or even
years later. The result is a missed opportunity to let
nature take its course and end the life of a person
who never wanted to live under such circum-
stances. In anticipation of this possibility, many
patients admitted to nursing homes write very spe-
cific advance directives, refusing treatment in the
face of any life-threatening emergencies. The fami-
lies may agree with this choice and the attorney
may be called in for support against the wishes of
the nursing home. The attorney may be asked to
discuss the advance directive when the patient is
first admitted to the nursing home to be sure that
the instructions are clear, or the attorney may be
contacted when the emergency arises if the nursing
home appears reluctant to adhere to the directive.
The patient who is conscious but not compe-
tent, such as an Alzheimer's patient, but who has
no advance directive, as is too often the case, must
depend on the nursing home's willingness to allow
the family to act as a surrogate. This is much more
problematical and open to negotiation. Nursing
homes may be more conservative than most hospi-
tals, and understandably do not want to have their
residents die when there is the slightest possibility
of legal liability. Strict regulations in most states
require evidence of the patient's wishes. Surrogate
and/or family members and their attorneys must be
unanimous in insisting that the patient's wishes be
obeyed. In the absence of responsible family, the
attorney may be the surrogate decision maker by
having power of attorney for a patient, having been
previously appointed by the patient or the court.
Patients or families may also contact an attor-
ney to insist that the patient be maintained in com-
fort and free of pain, regardless of any side effects
of the medication. Again, nursing homes may be
reluctant to give adequate doses of narcotics even
for patients with evidence of severe suffering. The
family or attorney must emphasize that the nursing
home is allowed to administer medication without
fear of liability. If the nursing home refuses to com-
ply with the physician's orders, the issue should be
taken beyond the administration of the nursing
home.
In the Hospital
The acute care hospital usually admits patients
who are sicker than nursing home patients. The
common medical issue that occasionally has legal
implications is to insist that the medical staff of the
institution not prolong the life of a patient beyond
what he or she wants. Unfortunately, transferring a
patient to a hospital often means a change in the
responsible personnel. A more aggressive team of
physicians and nurses may replace a long-time
physician who knows the patient well, including
what he or she has wanted in the past and would
want in the future.
The problem is the conscious and unconscious
confidence of physicians in applying their technical
knowledge and skill to seriously ill patients.
Modern medicine exists in a state of optimism that
can be hard to deflect. The result is that patients
are often given inflated hopes of the possibility that
treatment will be successful, in an atmosphere
where everything that can be done should be done,
unless someone says no. Patient, family, and attor-
ney are all in a position to say no. Recognizing
futility can be as hard for some physicians as it is
for many families. The converse of this is also true,
namely getting families to recognize obvious med-
ical futility, as seen by the physicians. Although
concerted efforts may be made to encourage the
family to consent to the removal of life-support sys-
tems, the family has the legal right to refuse.
The hospitalized patient is in the best place to
receive sufficient doses of narcotics to trade on the
double effect. This usually comes about as the
23
24 Elder's Advisor
result of a private conversation between patient
and physician, occasionally involving the family.
The patient's attorney is unlikely to be brought into
it for fear that too much discussion will attract
attention. Increasing the doses of narcotics for a
patient who is already receiving large doses is a
subtle judgment call that rarely arouses any curios-
ity, particularly when the patient is obviously
dying.
It should be noted that most hospitals have
policies that allow caregivers to refuse to partici-
pate in activities that they personally consider to be
morally wrong (e.g., abortion). Hence a nurse may
refuse to administer a narcotic dose that she
believes is excessive. However, there are many
nurses who are compassionate and familiar with
the dying and will place the patient's needs and
wishes ahead of other considerations.
The patient may ask outright for psychological
oblivion, even if it may mean shortening life. The
attorney probably serves his or her client's interests
best by also not looking too closely into what is
happening, assuming that an earlier death really is
in the client's best interest.
Following discharge from the hospital, terminal
patients may feel strongly about living their final
days at home, in familiar surroundings with easy
access to family and friends. If the family is willing
and able to provide the nursing care, this is an ideal
situation. Visiting nurses and home hospice pro-
grams can supplement and support the efforts of
the family in many ways.
Nursing homes are often unable to provide sig-
nificant medical needs, especially intravenous feed-
ing. Hospice, on the other hand, is renowned for its
experience and skill in caring for the dying, partic-
ularly in the areas of pain and symptom control. It
too is reluctant to provide intravenous fluids or
feedings, preferring that patients and families
accept the restrictions imposed by the terminal dis-
ease. 28 The concept of a terminal disease and the
finality associated in the public mind with admis-
sion to hospice makes some people reluctant to
consider transfer until they are nearly dead, or to
avoid it altogether by remaining at home.
Occasionally attorneys may be involved in such
end-of-life decisions.
Complicated interactions between patient and
family and among different members of a family
are common in the hospital. The legal hierarchy is
the competent patient, the spouse, adult children
(not necessarily in any order), parents, and siblings.
Last-minute decisions in stressful circumstances
may create significant hostility in a family. The pri-
mary responsibility is to respect the wishes of the
patient, if they are known.
Much comment has been made about the
potentially abusive family member who may have
an underlying motive to see the patient die in hopes
of benefiting from the estate. Far more common is
the almost equally, but more understandably, abu-
sive family member who hears the patient say
"enough" but admonishes the physicians not to lis-
ten. "I don't want to be left alone," said by a
spouse, can create severe guilt in a patient who
wants to end his or her suffering. Under such cir-
cumstances, hospital physicians often feel justified
in assuming a more active, interventional role. For
instance, the wife of an unconscious and dying
patient of mine ended the dissension within her
family by stating "we have to stop thinking of our-
selves and think of him. He certainly would not
have wanted this."
Every effort should be made to reach a consen-
sus within a family and between the family and the
medical staff. One approach is to accept a compro-
mise such as "OK, let's try the ventilator for one
week and if there is no improvement then we will
discuss whether to discontinue it." Do-not-resusci-
tate orders can be taken to court, but our courts are
predisposed to "life" under most circumstances
and therefore reluctant to let a person die. It is far
better to settle the question out of court. Many
hospitals' medical ethics committees represent
another source of help. These committees can give
advice and be very supportive; however, they carry
no legal authority.
At Home
Any discussion of the circumstances surrounding
the end of life that takes place at the patient's
home (or in the attorney's office) is apt to involve
long-range planning with a wide spectrum of
options. The most frequent and obvious topics
include the development of an advance directive or
living will and the documented appointment of a
surrogate. Patients who acknowledge and under-
stand their illness can obtain information from
their physician concerning the possible and proba-
ble events that may occur toward the end of life. In
addition to the usual generalities included in a liv-
ing will, the attorney can be quite specific about
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the management of particular events that may be
confronted.
The living will provides the surrogate with an
autonomously produced document. Usually the
nearest of kin, either a spouse or a responsible
child, is named as a surrogate. Where there is
known or expected dissension within the family,
the attorney can help by encouraging the client to
make his or her desires clear to all concerned in the
presence of the attorney and well documented so
that future difficulties can be avoided.
The period following the execution of a living
will and prior to a terminal illness may provide an
ideal time for their clients to disclose their long-
range wishes, objectives, and plans. A person who
has experienced the loss of a loved one to a termi-
nal illness may want to ensure that "this won't hap-
pen to me." Clients may reveal that they and their
physician have mutually agreed on the course of
action in the event of a terminal illness and that
they have "reached an understanding."
An increasingly common concern among
healthy adults is the possibility of developing
Alzheimer's disease. Thirty percent of all people
over the age of 80 have some form of dementia,
and the number of people living long lives is
increasing rapidly.9 At the present time there is no
legally or medically acceptable way that
Alzheimer's patients can have their life ended,
regardless of how much planning and arranging
they did when they were well. Their living will
would have to be binding they are no longer com-
petent to consent to anything, or do anything to
end their own life, a life that may remain suspend-
ed in a mental vacuum for years.
Regardless of what a client wants, or what an
attorney suspects that the client may want, it is
important to be sure that that client's ideas are
autonomous and voluntary. To ensure that this is
the case, the following questions should be
answered: Is the client rational and competent to
make medical decisions? Is the client's understand-
ing of the disease and prognosis accurate, and the
planning, so far as he or she reveals it, appropriate
to the circumstances? Is there any evidence of coer-
cion by members of the client's family, or does he
or she have their support?
Financial concerns about medical expenses are
a fact of life in our society, with its uneven and very
limited health care system. A patient may be con-
cerned about the financial impact of the illness on
his or her family. Thus, it is important for the attor-
ney to consider the implications of these concerns.
Life insurance and some forms of trusts carry a
waiting period of two or three years before the
death benefits are paid. Therefore, attempts to
make special provisions toward the end of life may
not succeed. Similarly, late changes in wills or
trusts may or may not be appropriate.
Finally, it should be noted that in states where
assisted dying is not legal, a patient is unlikely to
discuss a planned suicide. It is almost axiomatic that
the rational patient would never discuss such plans
with an attorney. The exception to this may be the
patient who has a long-standing professional or per-
sonal relationship with an attorney and turns to him
or her as a friend as well as an advisor. Here, friend-
ship and his or her own moral compass must guide
the attorney. If the patient is competent and termi-
nally ill, I would hope that the attorney would not
feel it was necessary to interfere. A reasonably
broad discussion of all of the possibilities could
avoid the problem of giving direct advice. Such a
conversation would be relatively safe for the attor-
ney since it would be very unlikely to go beyond the
room. If the family was already involved, or likely
to become involved, they should be encouraged to
participate in the discussion.
Patients may hint at what they want to do by
going beyond the usual discussion of setting their
affairs straight and trying to make sure that their
family understands the financial issues that will fol-
low their death. If there is any indication, direct or
indirect, that a client is seeking to shorten his or her
life, the attorney should be sure that the client under-
stands the need to reduce or eliminate the legal risk
to the family. If the client plans to take a lethal dose
of medication and the family is aware and involved,
they may wish to be present. It is important that they
do not do anything that can later be construed as
providing physical help. In fact, there is minimal risk
incurred from simply being present. Two organiza-
tions, the Hemlock Society"o and Compassion in
Dying,"1 provide trained volunteers who will sit with
the patient and the family throughout the dying
process. It is equally important that members of the
family do not attempt to thwart the patient's wishes
at the very end.
In states that forbid assisted dying, it is in the
physician's best interest for the death to appear to
be from the disease itself or as the result of normal
treatment. This may mean delaying any assistance
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until the patient is a few days or weeks from dying
from the disease so that death is not too early or
unexpected. The physician may prefer to provide
multiple prescriptions during an extended time
period to allow the patient to accumulate the med-
ication. Finally, treatment of pain and suffering
with a continuous drip of morphine can be carried
out at home and the dose can be increased as need-
ed, accepting the double effect that may occur. For
instance, AIDS patients in California frequently
request a morphine drip with the understanding
between patient and physician that the medication
will be used to end the suffering.
With most states having laws against assisted
dying, the patient who wishes to obtain such help
is in a difficult position. However, it is a fact that
many physicians are willing to help their patients
die, particularly patients who they know well and
for whom they have cared a long time. The patient
will not know where his or her own physician
stands on this issue without asking. If it is impor-
tant to the patient, he or she should raise the issue
while there is still time to transfer to another
physician. Although there is no obligation to do
so, I see no reason why an attorney should not
suggest that a client discuss assisted dying with his
or her own physician. The help that is wanted may
be available.
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